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Introduction
Many friendly nations obtain sophisticated U.S. military technology and arms through foreign military sales (FMS) programs and various technology disclosure agreements. Some highly industrialized nations find ways to manufacture and improve upon U.S. technology and have become competitors in the defense marketplace through the unauthorized retransfer of U.S. derived technology and arms. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), export laws, and other trade agreements were put in place to ensure that critical U.S. technology and arms are not retransferred to nations that threaten the U.S. However, these agreements and laws are not always followed and are often times difficult to enforce. The retransfer of arms and defense technology has obvious economic impacts by taking business away from the U.S. domestic defense industry, but may also bring about foreign intelligence compromises, regional instability, strained diplomatic relations, and potential threats to U.S. national security. 1 Israel has gained tremendous benefit from the U.S. defense trade relationship and its generous military support. Through U.S. military aid and economic support, Israel has transformed its "armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world," and has built "a domestic defense industry which ranks as one of the top ten suppliers of arms worldwide." 2 This cooperative security relationship has been strained at times over occasions of Israel selling or attempting to sell U.S. derived technology and arms to China and other potentially threatening nations. 3 Current trade agreements and the 1952 memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the U.S. and Israel do not seem to be enough for Israel to understand expectations associated with the trade of sensitive military technology.
Although Israel has expressed a desire to remedy issues within its defense security trade process with the U.S. and has signed numerous bilateral agreements, no formal arms or defense trade treaty exists between the two countries. Such a treaty could solidify the expectations of each nation with respect to arms and defense technology retransfer and could set up a cooperative working relationship between the two defense agencies (U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Israel Ministry of Defense (MoD)). It would also formally reaffirm to the world that Israel is one of the U.S.'s closest allies.
This paper examines examples of Israel retransferring U.S. origin technology, the U.S.
Israel relationship, existing defense agreements between them, the U.S. defense trade controls process, and the current Israeli defense export controls, and presents a possible method for trade oversight and security collaboration. It proposes a defense trade cooperation treaty and examines implementation at the high and mid levels. Although there are many delicate aspects to the U.S.
Israel defense trade relationship, similar treaties have been worked out for both Great Britain and
Australia and a formal treaty can provide benefits to both nations involved. 4 
Background
Israel is a longstanding ally of the U.S. and "is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S.
foreign assistance since WWII." 5 Israel has a strong technical industrial base that has been heavily supported by the U.S. and is a real competitor in the world arms market. Israel has been charged on numerous occasions with misusing U.S. arms and selling sensitive U.S. origin technology to unfriendly nations, including China, Iran, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Chile. 6 The unauthorized retransfer of arms and technology is a serious issue that has economic impacts and can bring about foreign intelligence compromises, regional instability, strained diplomatic relations, and potential threats to U.S. national security. 
Defense Technology and Arms Retransfer Issue
The issue of unauthorized defense technology or arms retransfer has many serious repercussions. It has the economic impact of affecting the U.S. defense industry by taking away potential foreign customers, the security impact of allowing unfriendly nations to see what capabilities the U.S. has, while adding to instability to regions of U.S. interest. It can also strain diplomatic relations with the country doing the retransfer. 8 Along with the loss of U.S.
technology and arms supremacy, there is also the risk to national security of potential adversaries gaining an advantage by exploiting vulnerabilities of the most advanced systems.
Only a few allies have access to the most sophisticated U.S. technology and arms, and those that do must protect them. Retransfer of U.S. origin technology or defense articles without clear U.S. permission must not be allowed and the penalties for doing so must be severe and enforced. Ideally, the existing trade laws and regulations would provide enough security to protect high-technology articles; however, weaknesses exist in the licensing processes and end use enforcement suffers from inadequate guidelines. 9 Due to weaknesses in manning and lack of guidance from the DoD and DoS, and the fact that end use accountability relies on host country records in many cases, there is minimal oversight and often times no knowledge of what happens to articles after they are in the possession of the receiving nation. 10 The case of Israel participating in defense technology retransfer is unique. As Israel is a major U.S. non-NATO ally and has received the largest cumulative amount of U.S. aid since WWII, there was a natural tension when Israel became an industrial defense competitor. 11 Since
Israel's defense industry must export approximately 75% of its products to stay viable, it puts Israel in a situation in which it must compete against the U.S., especially in the most lucrative markets. 12 Unfortunately, many of those markets are nations with which the U.S. is not as closely allied, such as China. The Chinese defense market is a potential gold mine for arms sales and even the European Union desires to lift the existing embargo to gain access to it. 13 Exports of sensitive U.S. origin technology to these markets, lucrative though they may be, must be closely controlled to prevent dangerous repercussions, including having those weapons used against the U.S. or its allies or possible effective countermeasure development.
Israel has signed defense agreements with the U.S. which limit the use of U. economy.
Existing U.S.-Israel Agreements
Israel has a special security cooperation status with the U.S., but there is no formal defense treaty between the two nations. 22 However, Israel and the U.S. do have a number of signed agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) relating to defense and mutual security that are currently in force. 23 In 1952, an exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual defense was formalized between the U.S. and Israel. This was the first of many defense agreements between the two nations. It outlined military assistance provisions which limit the use of U.S. origin military equipment for only defensive purposes, restricts aggressive acts and requires permission from the U.S. prior to the sale or transfer of any U.S.
origin equipment or technology to third parties. 24 Many other defense agreements followed, including a memorandum of agreement (MOA) signed in 1975 which included a section of assurances from the U.S. government to Israel:
The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.
This assurance from the U.S. government was a clear statement of the U.S. commitment to cooperate with Israel on defense matters and showed a willingness to provide "high technology and sophisticated items." 26 In November 1981, Israel and the U.S. signed a MOU for a "framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance the national security of both nations." 27 This MOU was initially designed to counter the Soviet threat at the time, but it also established an increased level of military cooperation, including the formation of coordination groups to address military concerns. These joint working groups were tasked to address military cooperation for joint exercises, readiness issues, research and development (R&D), and defense trade. 28 This MOU, and the associated working groups, was suspended by the U.S. in protest as Israel occupied the Golan Heights in December 1981. 29 It was reinstated in 1983, however, and was the driver behind another agreement that created the Joint Political
Military Group (JPMG) and Joint Security Assistance Program (JSAP), which are very high level groups that focus on larger defense issues. In 1988, Israel and the U.S. signed another MOA which established a more comprehensive framework for cooperation for both diplomatic and defense issues. This arrangement reaffirmed the JPMG and the JSAP planning groups, outlined their meeting schedules and restated the roles of each. 30 The agreement which specifically addresses the issues of cooperative R&D and procurement of defense articles was a MOA with annexes and attachment signed in December 1987. This agreement followed an earlier declaration in January 1987 that designated Israel as a major non-NATO ally. The December MOA opened up smoother procurement processes as it allowed Israel to bid on U.S. defense contracts in the same manner as NATO nations, which is a much easier and faster process. 31 Many amendments to the above mentioned agreements exist, but the spirit of security and defense cooperation has remained unchanged over the last 30 years. Within the guidelines of the export laws and directives listed above, there are two main channels for nations to obtain arms and military technology: government programs and commercial programs. Commercial programs are those that are initiated by a contractor, such as a direct commercial sale. 43 These programs, when used for defense articles, require licensing or export authorization through the ITAR processes. This method of export side-steps many of the other governmental controls in place to monitor arms exports and is typically used for items that are not as high-tech or sophisticated. Sales of items that are considered dual-use (items that have both a civilian and military use) also fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce under the Bureau of Industry and Security. Such items are additionally regulated to ensure that all national security controls are in place, sales are consistent with U.S. policy and items are not in short supply. 44 Government programs are those that are initiated by a government agency and typically fall under the AECA, such as cooperative agreements or FMS. These programs undergo further jurisdiction in accordance with the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) which is administered and managed by the DoD. 45 Typically, FMS cases that include service specific technologies or weapon systems will have further involvement by the appropriate service agencies and acquisition program offices. Figure 1 shows the U.S. key players and their relationships. 
U.S. Defense Technology Trade Key Players

Current Israeli Defense Export Controls
Israeli defense exports are handled by SIBAT (the Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export Department), while export controls are handled by the Defense Export Control Directorate, which both fall under the Director General of the MoD. 48 There are numerous factors that shape Israeli defense export control: the need to maintain a military advantage over its neighbors, the advanced nature of the Israeli defense industry, the relationship between the defense industry and the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) development programs, and the requirement of Israel's defense industry to export over 70% of its products to stay profitable are key characteristics that impact defense exports. 49 Defense export control is "recognized at all levels of Government" as necessary to support bi-lateral and international defense goals and relationships. 50 To better understand Israel's defense procurement process, see appendix A.
Due to U.S. retransfer concerns of the past two decades, Israel has recently, within the last 3 years, taken steps to tighten defense export controls. In July 2006, the MoD established the Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD), which acts as a separate licensing authority. 
52
By taking these steps, Israel is developing internal measures to foster defense export control compliance. 53 These steps will hopefully mitigate the retransfer issue but there needs to be swift and severe U.S. ramifications that are clearly understood and agreed to by both nations when unauthorized retransfer does occur. A formal treaty could be the answer. has proven not to be enough. Though some progress has been made in the last three years, a treaty between Israel and the U.S. is needed to formalize dialog on defense technology needs, increase the level of cooperation and transparency, guard sensitive U.S. technology, protect the defense industries of both Israel and the U.S., and ensure the national security of both nations.
Methodology for Trade Cooperation and Oversight
Defense trade cooperation treaties exist between the U.S. and Australia and the U.S. and the United Kingdom as described more fully in appendix B. These treaties were created in an effort to increase U.S. defense and security cooperation with its closest allies as well as to simplify the defense trade process. 54 Although the thrust of these treaties is geared toward expedition of the export licensing process, there are also provisions to ensure that "both the U.K.
and Australia will protect U.S.-origin items as classified and require prior U.S. approval for the re-export of these items." 55 As technology is rapidly evolving and is often dual-use, some restrictions on technology become obsolete by its availability on the world market. The existing U.S. defense export laws are not versatile enough to keep up with the high pace of technology development today. In the case of dual-use technology, which is becoming more and more prevalent in the defense sector, the U.S. has failed "to adopt policies that take into account and respond effectively to fundamental changes in the interaction between technological progress globally, the relationship between civilian and military technological developments and the post-Cold War geo-political situation." 56 Through a close collaboration with Israel, which is one of the top four arms dealers in the world market, the U.S. can gain some much needed insight into the trends of world defense technology sales.
Since an overhaul of the existing defense trade laws, needed though it may be, is not likely to occur in the near term, clear agreements and collaboration with our closest allies are needed. The U.S. has already worked out defense trade cooperation treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia to meet defense technology licensing and retransfer concerns. These treaties clearly outline a working relationship and put limits on particularly sensitive U.S.
technologies, ensuring that the streamlined processes will not allow unauthorized retransfer. 57 Such a treaty, though with a different focus, with Israel will reinforce mutual expectations and can be a mechanism to create working groups at various levels to ensure that Israel has access to the technology it needs to defend itself while the U.S. has the oversight it needs to ensure that there is no added risk to U.S. national security.
Conclusion
Israel is a long-time U.S. ally and will continue to be one for the foreseeable future. The The MoD is the most powerful ministry in the Israeli government and is the strongest voice when it comes to defense issues. 3 "The major goals of the MoD are to develop and prepare infrastructure and resources for implementing IDF objectives, to design and implement procurement, manufacture, development, construction, and service arrangements in order to give the IDF the means it needs to do their job;…to develop and administer the defense export system, to administer, plan and control the defense budget," making it the overall civilian control of the Israeli military establishment. 4 The MoD is responsible for all aspects of procurement and finance for the IDF. 5 There are two main agencies within the MoD that support the defense procurement process: the Procurement and Production Directorate (PPD) and the Directorate of Defense R&D. The PPD handles procurement and manufacture of defense systems and is responsible for overseas procurements, including those made using funds provided from U.S.
military aid. The Directorate of Defense R&D deals with all aspects of defense R&D, including sponsoring and enhancing scientific and technological infrastructure, "facilitating the development and enhancement of high-impact war materiel and auxiliary combat equipment," as well as working with international R&D institutions. 6 Overall, the MoD has a long-term vision with respect to defense procurement, looking to arm Israel for any future threats.
The IDF is Israel's military organization and the General Staff "is responsible for procurement, training and force structure" for the military. 7 The IDF Planning Division provides planning and assessment of the IDF's needs and priorities and incorporates them into budget requests to the MoD. Although the MoD controls the IDF, the IDF has the preponderance of planning resources, and therefore the MoD usually accepts IDF recommendations for procurement decisions. The trend for IDF procurement priority has been to counter short-term threats and has emphasized off the shelf weapon procurements and ready access to arms. It has given less priority to longer term projects requiring R&D. 8 The Israeli defense industry is a mix of private industry and state-owned firms. The state owned sector produces and develops the bulk of Israeli weapons and defense technology. There are three key organizations that make up the state owned defense industry that are controlled by the MoD: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Ta'as, and Rafael Arms Development Authority.
These three companies cover the full spectrum of Israel's defense needs. IAI develops and manufactures satellite, missile and aircraft technology. Ta'as, formerly known as the Israel
Military Industry (IMI), develops and manufactures assault weapons, aircraft and rocket systems, armored vehicles, and integrated security systems. Rafael manufactures "smart" missiles, passive armor, naval decoys, acoustic torpedo countermeasures, air-breathing propulsion systems, and missiles. 9 In addition to the three main government-run firms, there are approximately 150 other privately owned defense firms in Israel. 10 These companies produce a narrower set of defense articles than the big government owned firms, but they represent a part of the Israeli "commitment to high levels of research and development" in defense. 11 They also contribute to Israel's ability to maintain a strong defense export capability. Figure 2 shows the linkages between Israel defense technology trade key players.
Israel's security planning and procurement decisions are based on the perceptions of the military threat posed by its Arab neighbors in the region. The overarching strategic approach to procurement is based on the development of a powerful multifaceted defense capability to defend against a variety of threats. The Israeli strategy focuses on three main components: "a large and powerful standing air force and an advanced intelligence capability, limited standing ground forces, and large armour and infantry reserve forces." 12 To determine what systems to procure, Israel uses long-term planning to assess trends and calculate requirements for funding.
Israel has a very structured approach to its defense import and export with the MoD taking the lead role. The Knesset, Israel's governing body, only controls the purse strings by approving the defense budget. In comparison to the U.S. export structure, which involves numerous departments (State, Defense, and Commerce) as well as congressional approval, the Israeli process is relatively straightforward. Defense procurement is based on the perceived threat to the nation and is somewhat influenced by the U.S., due to the large amount of U.S.
military aid that must be used for U.S. goods. There are a number of places within the existing defense procurement system in which the U.S. can work collaboratively to ensure that Israel is protecting sensitive U.S. technology. 
Israel Defense Technology Trade Key Players
